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ABSTRACT
Schulze’s rule is used in the elections of a large number of organi-
zations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its
popularity is the large number of axiomatic properties, like mono-
tonicity and Condorcet consistency, which it satisfies. We identify a
potential shortcoming of Schulze’s rule: it is computationally vul-
nerable to manipulation. In particular, we prove that computing
an unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) is polynomial for
any number of manipulators. This result holds for both the unique
winner and the co-winner versions of UCM. This resolves an open
question in [14]. We also prove that computing a weighted coali-
tional manipulation (WCM) is polynomial for a bounded number
of candidates. Finally, we discuss the relation between the unique
winner UCM problem and the co-winner UCM problem and argue
that they have substantially different necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of a successful manipulation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems;
F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Prob-
lem Complexity
General Terms
Economics, Theory
Keywords
social choice, voting, manipulation
1. INTRODUCTION
One important issue with voting is that agents may cast strategic
votes instead of revealing their true preferences. Gibbard [11] and
Sattertwhaite [15] proved that most voting rules are manipulable in
this way. Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [3] suggested computational
complexity may nevertheless act as a barrier to manipulation. In-
terestingly, it is NP-hard to compute a manipulation for many com-
monly used voting rules, including maximin, ranked pairs [17],
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Borda [6, 4], 2nd order Copeland, STV [2], Nanson and Bald-
win [13]. A recent survey on computational complexity as a barrier
against manipulation in elections can be found in [10]. We study
here the computational complexity of manipulating Schulze’s vot-
ing rule, which is arguably the most widespread Condorcet voting
method in use today.
Schulze’s rule was proposed by Markus Schulze in 1997, and
was quickly adopted by many organizations. It is, for example,
used by the Annodex Association, Blitzed, Cassandra, Debian, the
European Democratic Education Conference, the Free Software
Foundation, GNU Privacy Guard, the Haskell Logo Competition,
Knight Foundation, MTV, Neo, Open Stack, the Pirate Party, RLL-
MUK, Sugar Labs, TopCoder, Ubuntu and the Wikimedia Founda-
tion. In addition to being Condorcet consistent, Schulze’s rule satis-
fies many other desirable axiomatic properties, including Pareto op-
timality, monotonicity, Condorcet loser criterion, independence to
clones, reversal symmetry and the majority criterion. Schulze’s rule
is known by several other names including the Beatpath Method
and Path Voting. The method can be seen as the inverse procedure
to another Condorcet consistent voting method, ranked pairs. The
ranked pairs method starts with the largest defeats and uses as much
information about these defeats as it can without creating ambigu-
ity. By comparison, Schulze’s rule repeatedly removes the weakest
defeat until ambiguity is removed.
Schulze’s rule has a number of interesting computational prop-
erties. Whilst it is polynomial to compute the winner of Schulze’s
rule, it requires finding paths in a directed graph labeled with the
strength of defeats. Such paths can be found using a variant of the
cubic time Floyd-Warshall algorithm [1]. More recently, Parkes
and Xia initiated the study of the computational complexity of ma-
nipulating this voting rule [14]. They proved that in the unique
winner UCM problem it is polynomial for a single agent to com-
pute a manipulating vote if one exists. They also investigated the
vulnerability of Schulze’s rule to various types of control. How-
ever, they left the computational complexity of UCM with more
than one manipulator as an open question.
In this paper, we continue this study and show that UCM re-
mains polynomial for an arbitrary number of manipulators. For
users of Schulze’s rule, this result has both positive and negative
consequences. On the negative side, this means that the rule is
computationally vulnerable to being manipulated. On the positive
side, this means that when eliciting votes, we can compute in poly-
nomial time when we have collected enough votes to declare the
winner. Our results also highlight the importance of distinguishing
carefully between manipulation problems where we are looking for
a single winner compared to co-winners.
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Figure 1: The weighted majority graph GP and the table of
SP(x,y), x,y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} from Example 1.
2. DEFINITIONS
Voting systems. Consider an election with a set ofm candidates
C = {c1, . . . , cm}. A vote is specified by a total strict order on C:
ci1  ci2  · · ·  cim . An n-agent profile P on C consists of n
votes, P = (1,2, . . . ,n).
Schulze’s voting rule. Given an n-agent profile P on C,
Schulze’s rule determines a set of winnersWP ⊆ C as follows.
1. For candidates x 6= y, let NP (x, y) denote the number of
agents who prefer x over y, i.e. the number of indices i with
x i y.
2. The weighted majority graph (WMG) is a directed graphGP
whose vertex set is C, and with an arc of weight wP (x, y) =
NP (x, y) − NP (y, x) for every pair (x, y) of distinct can-
didates. We denote WMG associated with a profile P by
(GP , wP ).
3. The strength of a directed path pi = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) in GP
is defined to be the minimum weight over all its arcs, i.e.
wP (pi) = min
16i6k−1
wP (xi, xi+1).
4. For candidates x and y, let SP (x, y) denote the maximum
strength of a path from x to y, i.e.
SP (x, y) = max{wP (pi) : pi is a path from x to y in GP }.
A path from x to y is a critical path if its strength is SP (x, y).
5. The winning set is defined as
WP = {x ∈ C : ∀y ∈ C \ {x} SP (x, y) > SP (y, x)} .
If SP (x, y) > SP (y, x) for two candidates x, y, then we say that
x dominates y. Thus,WP is the set of non-dominated vertices.
The winning set is always non-empty [16]. Note that all weights
wP (x, y), (x, y) ∈ GP are either odd or even, depending on the
size of the profile P . Conversely, for any weighted digraph where
all weights have the same parity, a corresponding profile can be
constructed [7]. In the literature, for example, [17] and [14] refer
to this as McGarvey’s trick [12]. We use this result here as we de-
fine the non-manipulators’ profile by their weighted majority graph
instead of by their votes.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider an election with 5 alternatives
{a, b, c, d, e}. The weighted majority graph GP is shown in
Figure 1. We omit arcs with zero or negative weight for clar-
ity. The table shows values SP (x, y), x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
As can be seen from the table, SP (a, x) > SP (x, a), for all
x ∈ {b, c, d, e}. Hence, the winning set contains a single
alternativeWP = {a}.
Strategic behavior. We distinguish between agents that vote
truthfully and agents that vote strategically. We call the latter
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Figure 2: The WMG and the table of SPNM∪PM(x,y),
x,y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} from Example 2.
manipulators. We use the superscript NM to denote the non-
manipulators’ profile and the superscript M to denote the manip-
ulators’ profile. The co-winner unweighted coalitional manipula-
tion (UCM) problem is defined as follows. An instance is a tuple
(PNM , c,M), where PNM is the non-manipulators’ profile, c is
the candidate preferred by the manipulators andM is the set of ma-
nipulators. We are asked whether there exists a profile PM for the
manipulators such that c ∈ WPNM∪PM . The unique winner UCM
problem is a variant of the co-winner UCM where we are looking
for a manipulation such that {c} = WPNM∪PM . The weighted
coalitional manipulation (WCM) is defined similarly, where the
weights of the agents (both non-manipulators and manipulators)
are integers and are also given as inputs.
3. WEIGHTED COALITIONAL MANIPU-
LATION
We consider the co-winner WCM problem for Schulze’s voting
rule. We show that if there exists a successful manipulation PM
then there exists a successful manipulation PM
′
where all manip-
ulators vote identically. We prove this result in two steps. First, we
construct a kind of directed spanning tree of the WMGGPNM∪PM
rooted at c, which gives us a critical path from c to all other alter-
natives. Then, by traversing this tree, we build a new linear order
of candidates that specifies a vote for all manipulators.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the WMG GP from Example 1. Sup-
pose that P corresponds to the non-manipulators’ profile, so that
PNM = P . Suppose we have 4 manipulators with weights 10, 3, 2
and 5 that vote in the following way: the first three manipula-
tors vote c  e  d  b  a and the last manipulator votes
c  a  e  d  b. Hence, the total weight of the vote
c  e  d  b  a in PM is 15 and the total weight of the vote
c  a  e  d  b in PM is 5. The updated WMG GPNM∪PM
and the corresponding table that shows the values of pairwise max-
imum strengths are shown in Figure 2. Note that the alternative c
is non-dominated as well as alternatives {a, d, e}. Hence, the win-
ning setWPNM∪PM = {a, c, d, e}.
We show that given any profile P , a winning candidate c ∈ WP
and a subset P0 of the set of votes, e.g. P0 = PM , we can modify
the votes in P0 to be all the same, and c is still in the winning set of
the resulting profile P ′. To do this, we construct a vote Λ = (c 
c1  · · ·  cm−1) such that c is still a winner if we replace every
vote in P0 by Λ. Hence, in the context of the manipulation problem
we can think of P as PNM ∪ PM and P0 as PM .
An out-branching T of a directed graph G rooted at a vertex r is
a connected spanning subdigraph of G in which r has in-degree 0
and all other vertices have in-degree 1.
LEMMA 1. Let G = GP be the digraph associated with the
given profile P . There exists an out-branching T rooted at c in G
ce
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Figure 3: (a) The out-branching rooted at c that is pro-
duced by Algorithm 1 and the corresponding critical c-x-paths,
x ∈ {a,b,d, e}; (b) The Λ ordering constructed by Algo-
rithm 2.
such that for every candidate c′ 6= c the unique path from c to c′ in
T is a critical c-c′-path in G.
PROOF. We construct an out-branching T of G by Algorithm
1. At the initial step the algorithm makes c the root of T . At each
step, we add a new vertex x, x ∈ V (G) \ V (T ), to the tree T iff
the arc (x, y), y ∈ V (T ) has maximum value w(x, y) among all
arcs (x′, y′), x ∈ V (G) \ V (T ), y ∈ V (T ).
Algorithm 1 Out-branching construction
Input: a weighted digraph (G,w) = (GP , wP ) and
a distinguished candidate c.
Initialize F1 = {c}, X1 = C \ {c} and T1 = {}.
for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
D = max{w(x, y) : x ∈ Fi, y ∈ Xi}
Choose a ∈ Fi and b ∈ Xi with w(a, b) = D
Fi+1 = Fi ∪ {b}
Xi+1 = Xi \ {b}
Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {(a, b)}
return T = Tm
Clearly, Algorithm 1 returns an out-branching because the in-
put digraph is complete. So we just have to show that it satis-
fies the required property. We do this by induction on the size
of T . For i = 1 the claim is obvious, so assume 1 < i < m,
and let b be the vertex added in step i, i.e. {b} = Fi+1 \ Fi.
Let pi = (c = a0, a1, . . . , ak−1, ak = b) be the c-b-path in
T , and let j be the index of the first arc on that path realizing
its strength, i.e. j = min{t : w(at, at+1) = w(pi)}. Let
q be the step in which the arc (at, at+1) is added to T . Now
suppose that there is a c-b-path pi′ = (c, f1, . . . , fr, . . . , b) in G
with w(pi′) > w(pi). Because c ∈ pi′ and pi′ 6⊆ T , there exists
some arc (fr, fr+1) ∈ pi′ with fr ∈ Fq and fr+1 ∈ Xq . Then,
w(pi) = w(at, at+1) > w(fr, fr+1) > w(pi′), contradicting the
assumption and thus concluding the proof.
EXAMPLE 3. Figure 3(a) shows the out-branching for
GPNM∪PM and critical c-x-paths, x ∈ {a, b, d, e}, of the WMG
from Example 2. Consider, for example, the path (c, e, d) in the
out-branching. This path has strength 80 and it corresponds to the
maximum strength c-d-path in GPNM∪PM .
LEMMA 2. LetG = GP be the graph associated with the given
profile P and let T be an out-branching rooted at c as in Lemma 1.
Then there exists an ordering Λ = (c  c1  · · ·  cm−1) on the
set of candidates with the following properties.
• Property 1: For each ci the unique c-ci-path in T respects
the ordering Λ, i.e. it is of the form (c, cj1 , . . . , cjk =
ci) with 1 6 j1 < j2 < · · · < jk.
• Property 2: The strength of a critical path from ci, i ∈ [1,m)
to c is nonincreasing along the ordering Λ:
SP (ci, c) > SP (cj , c) for 1 6 i < j 6 m− 1.
The intuition for Property 1 is that the strength of each critical path
from c to ci, i ∈ [1,m) does not decrease if we change all votes in
P0 to Λ.
PROOF. Algorithm 2 returns a total order on the set of candi-
dates. The algorithm traverses the out-branching T obtained by
Algorithm 1. At each step, we identify a vertex x with the largest
value of the strength SP (x, c). Then we find the path pi from c to
x in T which is a critical path by Lemma 1. A prefix of the path
pi might be added to Λ at this point. Hence, we only focus on the
suffix of pi that does not contain vertices added to Λ. Then we add
the vertices in this suffix of pi to Λ in the order in which they appear
in pi. We terminate when Λ is a total order over all alternatives.
Algorithm 2 Construction of the ordering Λ
Input: a weighted digraph (G,w) = (GP , wP ),
a distinguished candidate c and
the out-branching T with root c from Algorithm 1.
Initialize Λ = (c), X = C \ {c}
while X 6= ∅ do
D = max{SP (x, c) : x ∈ X}
Let a ∈ X be any vertex with SP (a, c) = D.
Let pi be the unique c-a-path in T .
Add the vertices in pi ∩X to Λ in the order in which
they appear on pi.
Update X := X \ pi.
return Λ
We show that it satisfies the two properties by induction on the
length of Λ. For the initial Λ = (c) it is obviously true. So suppose
we are in the while loop adding pi ∩ X for a c-a-path pi = (c =
g0, g1, . . . , gk, a). Note that pi ∩X is a suffix of pi, i.e. pi ∩X =
{gj+1, . . . , gk, a} for some j. To see this, let gj be the last vertex
on pi that is already in Λ. Then by construction, all the vertices
g1, g2, . . . , gj have been added to Λ in the step in which gj was
added or earlier.
By the induction hypothesis the c-gj-path in T respects
Λ, and because the suffix gj+1, . . . , gk, a is added to Λ and
gj+1, . . . , gk, a is a sub-path of pi, the condition of Property 1 is
satisfied for all these vertices.
Next we observe that SP (gt, c) > SP (a, c) for t = j+1, . . . , k.
To see this, let pi′ be an a-c-path of strength SP (a, c). We have
w(gt, gt+1) > SP (c, a) > SP (a, c) for all t, where the first in-
equality is true because (gt, gt+1) is an arc on the c-a-path in T
which is a critical path, and the second inequality because c is a
winner. Thus the concatenation of gt, gt+1, . . . , gk, a and pi′ pro-
vides a gt-c-path of strength SP (a, c). Now Property 2 follows
from the observation that SP (x, c) 6 SP (a, c) for all x ∈ X \ pi
which follows from the maximality condition in the step where a is
chosen.
EXAMPLE 4. We construct an ordering Λ based on the out-
branching obtained in Example 3. The alternatives {d, e}
are such that SPNM∪PM (e, c) = SPNM∪PM (d, c) =
max{SPNM∪PM (x, c) : x ∈ {a, b, d}}. We break the tie
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Figure 4: An updated WMG and the table of
SPNM∪PM(x,y), x,y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} from Example 4
using the Λ ordering constructed by Algorithm 2.
between e and d arbitrarily and select d. Hence, we build a
partial order c  e  d. The next alternatives that we con-
sider are {b, a} as SPNM∪PM (b, c) = SPNM∪PM (b, a) =
max{SPNM∪PM (x, c) : x ∈ {a, b}}. We select b and add
the suffix a  b to the partial order c  e  d, so that we get
Λ = (c  e  d  a  b). Hence, 4 manipulators can vote
with respect to Λ. Figure 3(b) shows the execution of Algorithm 2.
Figure 4 shows the new WMG and the corresponding table of max-
imum strengths. It is easy to see that c is still a winner after the
manipulators change their votes.
For our given profile P and distinguished candidate c, we con-
struct an ordering Λ as described in the proof of Lemma 2.
THEOREM 1. Let P be any profile with candidate c in the win-
ning set, let P0 ⊆ P be any subprofile, and set P1 = P \ P0. Let
P ′ be the profile given by P ′ = P1 ∪ ⋃|P0|i=1 {Λ}, where Λ is the
ordering constructed in Lemma 2. Then c is still in the winning set
WP ′ .
PROOF. Denote the WMGs associated with the two profiles by
(G,w) = (GP , wP ) and (G′, w′) = (GP ′ , wP ′). We recall that
we use the out-branching T with root c obtained by Algorithm 1.
The theorem is based on the following two claims.
CLAIM 1. For each path pi in T starting from c the strength of
pi does not decrease in the graph G′, i.e. w′(pi) > w(pi).
By construction of Λ, we have w′(x, y) > w(x, y) for every arc
(x, y) ∈ T , and this implies Claim 1.
CLAIM 2. For every a-c-path pi, the strength of pi in G′ does
not exceed the strength of a critical a-c-path in G, i.e. w′(pi) 6
SP (a, c).
To prove Claim 2, assume, for the sake of contradiction, that a is
a vertex such that there is an a-c-path pi = (a = a1, . . . , ak = c)
with w′(pi) > SP (a, c), and w.l.o.g. we assume that for all ai-c-
paths σ, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, we have w′(σ) 6 SP (ai, c). Because c is
a winner with respect to P , pi must contain an arc (x, y) of weight
w(x, y) such that w(x, y) 6 SP (c, a). Let (b, d) = (ai, ai+1) be
the first arc with this property, i.e. i = min{j : w(aj , aj+1) 6
SP (a, c)}. Next we show the chain of inequalities
w′(pi)
(1)
> SP (a, c)
(2)
> SP (b, c)
(3)
> SP (d, c)
(4)
> SP ′(d, c)
(5)
> w′(pi),
which is a contradiction and thus proves the claim.
The following arguments for the single inequalities above are
illustrated in Figure 5.
(1) By assumption.
c
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Figure 5: A diagram illustrating the arguments for steps (2),(3)
and (4) of the inequality chain in the proof of Claim 2.
(2) As c is a winner for P , every a-c-path must contain an arc
(x, y) with w(x, y) 6 SP (c, a). By the choice of b,
we know that (b, d) is the first arc such that w(b, d) 6
SP (a, c). Hence, the strength of the a-b-path is greater than
the strength of the a-c-path, SP (a, b) > SP (a, c). Now
from SP (a, c) > min{SP (a, b), SP (b, c)} it follows that
SP (b, c) 6 SP (a, c).
(3) From the assumption w′(pi) > SP (a, c) it follows that
w′(b, d) > w(b, d) which implies that b comes before d
in the ordering Λ, and then the inequality (3) follows from
Lemma 2.
(4) By assumption, w′(σ) 6 SP (d, c) for all d-c-paths σ, hence
SP ′(d, c) 6 SP (d, c).
(5) Let pi1 be the d-c-subpath of pi. Then SP ′(d, c) > w′(pi1) >
w′(pi).
Together, Claims 1 and 2 prove the theorem.
COROLLARY 1. The co-winner WCM problem for Schulze’s
rule is polynomial if the number of candidates is bounded.
PROOF. As the number of candidates is bounded we can enu-
merate all possible distinct votes in polynomial time. From Theo-
rem 1 it follows that it is sufficient to consider manipulations where
all manipulators vote identically.
4. UNWEIGHTED COALITIONAL MA-
NIPULATION
In this section we present our main result: co-winner UCM is
polynomial for any number of manipulators. This closes an open
question raised in [14]. By Theorem 1, (PNM , c,M) is a Yes-
instance for co-winner UCM if and only if there is a vote ′ such
that c ∈ WPNM∪PM where votes in PM corresponds to ′. It
remains to decide if such a vote ′ exists.
As in the weighted case, we denote (G,w) = (GP , wP ) and
(G′, w′) = (GP ′ , wP ′) the WMGs of the voting profiles P =
PNM and P ′ = PNM ∪ PM with arc weight functions w and
w′, respectively, and SP ′(x, y) denotes the maximum strength of a
path from x to y in G′.
First, we give a high-level description of the two-stage algorithm.
In the first stage, we run a preprocessing procedure on G that aims
to identify a set of necessary constraints on the strengths SP ′(x, y),
such as SP ′(x, y) must be equal to SP (x, y)+ |M |. The procedure
is based on a set of rules that enforce necessary conditions for c to
win, namely, SP ′(c, x) > SP ′(x, c) must hold. If the preprocess-
ing procedure detects a failure then there is no set of votes for M
such that c becomes a winner. The pseudocode for the first stage of
the algorithm is given in Algorithm 3. Section 4.1 proves the cor-
rectness of Algorithm 3. If no failure is detected by applying these
rules during the preprocessing stage, we show that a manipulation
exists and provide a constructive procedure that finds a manipula-
tion. The pseudocode for the second stage of the algorithm is given
Algorithm 3 PREPROCESSINGBOUNDS.
Input: a weighted digraph (G = (V,E), w) = (GP , wP ),
the strengths SP and
a distinguished candidate c.
for (x, y) ∈ V × V do
w(x, y) = w(x, y) + |M |
w(x, y) = w(x, y)− |M |
U(x, y) = SP (x, y) + |M |
while no convergence do
/* Rule 1 */
for x ∈ V \ {c} do
U(x, c) = min{U(x, c), U(c, x)}
/* Rule 2 */
for x ∈ V \ {c} do
Vr = {y ∈ V : U(y, c) < U(x, c), y 6= c}
Er = {(f, g) ∈ E : w(f, g) < U(x, c)} ∪ Vr × V ∪ V × Vr
Gx =
(
(V \ Vr), (E \ Er)
)
if Gx contains no c-x-path then
U(x, c) = U(x, c)− 2
/* Rule 3 */
for x ∈ V \ {c} do
for y ∈ V \ {x, c} do
if U(x, c) < w(x, y)
U(y, c) = min(U(y, c), U(x, c))
for x ∈ V \ {c} do
if U(x, c) < SP (x, c)− |M | then
return FAIL
return U
in Algorithm 4. Here, the algorithm traverses vertices in G in a
specific order, which defines the manipulators votes. Section 4.2
proves the correctness of Algorithm 4.
4.1 Stage 1. Preprocessing
Algorithm 3 uses a function U(x, y), which for any two can-
didates x and y, gives an upper bound for SP ′(x, y). Initially,
U(x, y) := SP (x, y) + |M | for each pair (x, y). We also use
the following notation for an upper and lower bound of w′(x, y):
w(x, y) := w(x, y) + |M | and w(x, y) := w(x, y)− |M |.
In the first stage, Algorithm 3 decreases U(x, y) when it detects
necessary conditions implying SP ′(x, y) < U(x, y). The algo-
rithm is based on the following three reduction rules. We show that
these rules are sound in the sense that an application of a rule does
not change the set of solutions of the problem.
Rule 1. If there is a candidate x such that U(c, x) < U(x, c), then
set U(x, c) := U(c, x).
PROPOSITION 1. Rule 1 is sound.
PROOF. To see that Rule 1 is sound, suppose SP ′(x, c) >
SP ′(c, x). But then, c /∈WP ′ .
To state the next reduction rule, define for any candidate x the
directed graphGx obtained fromG by removing all vertices y with
U(y, c) < U(x, c) and all arcs (y, z) such that w(y, z) < U(x, c).
Rule 2. If there is a candidate x such that Gx has no directed path
from c to x, then set U(x, c) := U(x, c)− 2.
PROPOSITION 2. Rule 2 is sound.
PROOF. Suppose the premises of the rule hold, and, for the sake
of contradiction, suppose there exists a path in G′ from x to c with
c
e1 e2
d2
10 10
d1
b1
810
8 10
10
8
10
10
f1
a1
8
10
10
f2
a2
b2
10 6
Figure 6: The WMG GP from Example 5
strength s, where s equals U(x, c) before the application of the
rule. Since Gx has no directed path from c to x, all directed paths
in G from c to x pass either through a vertex y with U(y, c) < s
or through an arc (y, z) such that w(y, z) < s. Since any such
path has strength less than s, we have that SP ′(c, x) < s. But,
since c belongs to the winning set in G′, we have that SP ′(c, x) >
SP ′(x, c) > s, a contradiction. Thus, SP ′(x, c) < s. The sound-
ness of Rule 2 now follows from the fact that all SP ′(y, z) have
the same parity as |NM | + |M |, y, z ∈ V , and we maintain the
invariant that all U(·, ·) have this parity.
Rule 3. If there are candidates x, y 6= c such that U(x, c) <
w(x, y) and U(y, c) > U(x, c), then set U(y, c) :=
U(x, c).
PROPOSITION 3. Rule 3 is sound.
PROOF. Suppose SP ′(y, c) > U(x, c) and pi is a critical path
from y to c inG′. But then, the path x·pi, obtained by concatenating
x and pi, has strength min{w′(x, y), SP ′(y, c)}. Since w′(x, y) >
w(x, y) > U(x, c), the strength of this directed path from x to c
is strictly greater than U(x, c), contradicting our assumption that
U(x, c) is a necessary upper bound for SP ′(x, c).
We remark that Rules 1-3 decrement U(·, c) when necessary
conditions are found that require a smaller upper bound for
SP ′(·, c). Should at any time such a value U(x, c) become smaller
than SP (x, c) − |M |, then there are no votes for M that make c a
winner. In this case, the preprocessing algorithm returns FAIL.
THEOREM 2. Algorithm 3 is sound.
PROOF. Algorithm 3 implements Rules 1–3. As these rules are
sound, the algorithm is sound.
Consider how Algorithm 3 works on an example.
EXAMPLE 5. Consider an election with eleven alternatives
{a1, a2, b1, b2, c, d1, d2, e1, e2, f1, f2} with the WMG in Figure 6,
where |M | = 1 and c is the preferred candidate. We note that there
are two candidates b1 and b2 such that SP (c, x) = SP (x, c) − 2,
x ∈ {b1, b2}. For candidate b1 there are two ways to increase
SP (c, b1). The first way is to increase the strength of the c-e1-d1-
b1-path by ranking d1  b1. The second way is to increase the
strength of the c-e2-d2-b1-path by ranking e2  d2. If we select
the first way then an extension of d1  b1 to any total order leads
to c /∈ WP ′ . If we select the second way then we can build a suc-
cessful manipulation. We show that Algorithms 3– 4 successfully
construct a valid manipulation. We start with Algorithm 3. Table 1
shows execution of Algorithm 3 on this problem instance.
Alternatives C \ {c}
f1 f2 a1 a2 e1 e2 d1 d2 b1 b2
Initial values
U(c, ·) 11 11 9 9 11 11 11 9 9 7
U(·, c) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 9
Rule 1 updates U(d2, c), U(b1, c) and U(b2, c)
U(c, ·) 11 11 9 9 11 11 11 9 9 7
U(·, c) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7
Rule 3 updates U(f1, c) as U(b2, c) = 7 and w(b2, f1) = 9
U(c, ·) 11 11 9 9 11 11 11 9 9 7
U(·, c) 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7
Rule 2 updates U(a1, c) (Figure 7(a) for Ga1 )
U(c, ·) 11 11 9 9 11 11 11 9 9 7
U(·, c) 7 9 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 7
Rule 3 updates U(e1, c) and U(d1, c)
U(c, ·) 11 11 9 9 11 11 11 9 9 7
U(·, c) 7 9 7 9 7 9 7 9 9 7
Table 1: Execution of Algorithm 3 on Example 5.
U(c, ·)/U(·, c) stands for the upper bound value
U(c, c′)/U(c′, c), where c′ is the alternative in the corre-
sponding column, c′ ∈ C\{c}.
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Figure 7: (a) Ga1 . Deleted arcs and vertices are in gray. There
is no path from c to a1; (b) WMG GP∪{Λ} from Example 5
where Λ is a valid manipulation.
4.2 Stage 2. Construct manipulators’ votes
Algorithm 4 constructs a linear order Λ based on the following
greedy procedure. Initially, Λ = {}, c is the top candidate, lastv =
c, the frontier F = {c} and the set of unreached vertices X =
C\{c}. During the execution of the algorithm, Λ is a linear order on
F and contains an element x  y for any two consecutive vertices
x, y in this order. The vertex lastv is the last vertex in this order
c  · · ·  lastv.
While Λ is not a total order, the algorithm adds one of the
unreached vertices y to the end of a partial order Λ satisfying
the following conditions: x ∈ F , y ∈ X , U(y, c) = D and
w(x, y) > D, where D is the maximum value U(y, c) among all
unreached vertices y ∈ X .
THEOREM 3. Algorithm 4 constructs a total order Λ with top
element c. Moreover, for any vertex x ∈ V \ {c}, there is a c-x-
path pi = (c = x1, . . . , xp = x) such that w(xi, xi+1) > U(x, c)
and xi  xi+1 ∈ Λ, i = 1, . . . , p− 1.
PROOF. First, we need to prove that the algorithm can always
add a vertex y to the order Λ satisfying the conditions above. Let
z be any candidate from X such that U(z, c) = D. Since Rule 2
does not apply, the subgraph Gz has a directed path from c to z.
Algorithm 4 Construction of ordering Λ
Input: a weighted digraph (G = (V,E), w) = (GP , wP ),
the strengths SP ,
a distinguished candidate c and
the function U returned by Algorithm 3.
for (x, y) ∈ V × V do
w(x, y) = w(x, y) + |M |
Initialize F = {c}, X = C \ {c}, lastv = c and Λ = {}.
for i = 1, . . . , |V | − 1 do
D = max{U(y, c) : y ∈ X}
Choose x ∈ F and y ∈ X with w(x, y) > U(y, c) = D
F = F ∪ {y}
X = X \ {y}
Λ = Λ ∪ {lastv  y}
lastv = y
return Λ
Let (x, y) be the arc on this path with x ∈ F and y ∈ X (we could
possibly have that y = z). Also, by Rule 2 we have that U(y, c) >
U(z, c) and that w(x, y) > U(z, c). Thus, U(y, c) = D and
w(x, y) > D, which means that (x, y) satisfies the conditions of
the alternative y to be added to Λ.
We prove the second statement by induction. In the base case,
F = {c} and we add y such that w(c, y) > U(y, c). Hence,
pi = (c = x1, x2 = y), w(c, y) > U(y, c) and c  y ∈ Λ.
Suppose, the statement holds for i − 1 steps. Let (x, y) be the
arc such that x ∈ F and y ∈ X , w(x, y) > U(y, c) = D that we
add at the ith step. By the induction hypothesis, we know that there
is a c-x-path pi = (c = x1, . . . , xp = x) such that w(xj , xj+1) >
U(x, c) and xj  xj+1 ∈ Λ, j = 1, . . . , p− 1, p 6 i− 1. By the
selection of y, we get that w(x, y) > U(y, c). By Algorithm 4, we
know that U(x, c) > U(y, c). Hence, w(xj , xj+1) > U(x, c) >
U(y, c), j = 1, . . . , p − 1. As we add x  y to Λ we get that
there is a c-y-path pi = (c = x1, . . . , xp = x, xp+1 = y) such that
w(x, y) > U(y, c) and xj  xj+1 ∈ Λ, j = 1, . . . , p.
This order Λ defines the vote ′ of the manipulators.
THEOREM 4. Consider the order Λ returned by Algorithm 4.
Then c ∈WP ′ , where P ′ = PNM ∪
⋃|M|
i=1{Λ}.
PROOF. Due to the construction of Λ, we know that
SP ′(c, x) > U(x, c), x ∈ V \ {c} as for each vertex x there is a
c-x-path σ = (c = x1, x2, . . . , xp = x) such that w(xi, xi+1) >
U(x, c) and xi  xi+1 ∈ Λ, i = 1, . . . , p− 1.
Let us make sure that SP ′(x, c) 6 U(x, c) for each candidate
x ∈ V \ {c}. On the contrary, suppose there is a candidate x such
that SP ′(x, c) > U(x, c) and suppose among all such vertices, x
has the shortest critical path to c. Denote by pi = (x, x1, x2, . . . , c)
a shortest critical path from x to c. Consider two cases depending
on whether x1 = c or x1 6= c.
Suppose that x1 6= c. We have that SP ′(x1, c) > SP ′(x, c)
since the path pi is critical. Therefore, U(x1, c) > U(x, c) by the
selection of x and pi. Since candidates are added by non-increasing
values of U(·, c) to Λ, x1 was added before x, so that x1 ′ x.
Thus, w′(x, x1) = w(x, x1). By Reduction Rule 3, we have that
w(x, x1) 6 U(x, c). Thus, w′(x, x1) 6 U(x, c), contradicting
that pi has strength > U(x, c) in G′.
Suppose that x1 = c. In this case, pi = (x, c) and SP ′(x, c) =
w′(x, c). As c is the top element of Λ we have that w′(x, c) =
w(x, c) = w(x, c)− |M |. As Algorithm 3 did not detect a failure,
we know that U(x, c) > SP (x, c) − |M |. Moreover, SP (x, c) >
w(x, c), by definition of the critical path. Therefore, U(x, c) >
SP (x, c)−|M | > w(x, c)−|M | = w′(x, c) = SP ′(x, c). Hence,
SP ′(x, c) 6 U(x, c), contradicting that pi has strength > U(x, c)
in G′.
Note that Corollary 1 does not follow from Theorem 4, be-
cause Algorithm 3 takes O(wmax|V |3) time, where wmax =
max(x,y)∈V×V w(x, y). As wmax can be O(2|V |), Algorithm 3
takes exponential number of steps in WCM.
EXAMPLE 6. Consider how Algorithm 4 works on Example 5.
The algorithm traversesG by vertices ordered by the valueU(x, c),
x ∈ C \ {c}. Initially, we start at c, and F = {c} and X =
C \ {c}. We compute D = max{U(y, c) : y ∈ X}, D = 9. We
consider all vertices y ∈ X such that U(y, c) = 9, which is the
set Q = {f2, a2, e2, d2, b1}. We select one of those vertices, f2,
that satisfies the condition on the value w(x, y), x ∈ F , y ∈ X:
w(c, f2) = 11 > U(f2, c) = 9. In the next four steps we add all
elements of Q and obtain a partial order Λ = c  f2  a2 
e2  b1. The next maximum value D = max{U(y, c) : y ∈ C \
{c, f2, a2, e2, d2, b1} is 7. The set of vertices such thatU(y, c) = 7
is Q = {f1, a1, e1, d1, b2}. Hence, we add these vertices to Λ one
by one and obtain a total order Λ = c  f2  a2  e2  b1 
f1  a1  b2  e1  d1. Figure 7(b) shows the WMG GP∪{Λ}.
We omitted all arcs of weight 1 for clarity.
5. UNIQUE WINNER VS CO-WINNER
UCM
In this section we consider the unweighted coalitional manipula-
tion problem with a single manipulator that was considered in [14].
Parkes and Xia showed that the unique winner UCM for Schulze’s
rule with a single manipulator can be solved in polynomial time.
We emphasize that in this variant the aim is to make the pre-
ferred candidate c the unique winner. The aim of this section is
to show that the proof from [14] cannot be extended to the co-
winner UCM problem with one manipulator. This demonstrates
that the co-winner UCM problem with one manipulator was not re-
solved in [14]. We also extend our algorithm for co-winner UCM
to the unique winner case. Another reason to investigate the rela-
tion between properties of unique winner and co-winner manipu-
lation problems is that they are closely related to the choice of tie-
breaking rules. If the tie-breaking rule breaks ties against the ma-
nipulators then the manipulators have to ensure that the preferred
candidate is the unique winner of an election. If the tie-breaking
rule breaks ties in favor of the manipulators then it is sufficient for
the manipulators to guarantee that the preferred candidate is one of
the co-winners of the election to achieve the desired outcome.
The proof that the unique winner UCM is polynomial is based
on the resolvability property [16, Section 4.2.2]. The resolvability
criterion states that any co-winner can be made a unique winner by
adding a single vote.
Resolvability. If SP (c, x) > SP (x, c) for all candidates x ∈
C \ {c}, then there is a vote v such that SP∪{v}(c, x) >
SP∪{v}(x, c) for all candidates x ∈ C \ {c}.
The proof of the property is constructive. Clearly, c can be the
unique winner in P ∪ {v} only if c is a co-winner in P . The vote
v is constructed using two rules that we describe below. We denote
P = PNM and {v} = PM to simplify notations.
(1) For every alternative x ∈ C \ {c}, we require y  x in the
manipulator’s vote v where y is the predecessor of x on some
strongest path from c to x.
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Figure 8: (a) The WMG GP and the table of
SP(x,y), x,y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} from Example 7; (b)/(c) The
WMG GP/GP∪{v} and the table of SP(x,y)/SP∪{v}(x,y),
x,y ∈ {a,b, c,d} from Example 8.
(2) For any x, y ∈ C \ {c} with SP (x, c) > SP (y, c) we require
x  y in the manipulator’s vote v.
It was shown in [16] that the resulting set of preference relations
does not contain cycles and thus can be extended to a linear or-
der which makes c the unique winner. However, it was also shown
in [16] that the same approach cannot resolve ties between candi-
dates that do not belong to the winning set. It is a natural ques-
tion if a candidate c that is not in the winning set can be made a
winner by adding a single vote. Clearly a necessary condition is
SP (c, x) > SP (x, c)− 2 for all x ∈ C \ {c}. So we can formulate
the following problem.
Single vote UCM. Given a profile P and a candidate c with
SP (x, c) 6 SP (c, x) + 2 for all x ∈ C \ {c}, does there
exist a single vote v such that c ∈ WP∪{v}?
Here, we show that the straightforward adaption of the above rules
does not solve this problem, even if there is a single vote manipula-
tion that makes c a winner. A major difference between the unique
winner and the co-winner UCM problems is that the manipulation
always exists in the former problem and it might not exist in the
latter as the following example demonstrates.
EXAMPLE 7. Consider an election with five alternatives
{a, b, c, d, e}. Figure 8(a) shows the WMG and the correspond-
ing table of maximum strengths. The unique winner is b. However,
the difference SP (x, c)− SP (c, x) 6 2, x ∈ {a, b, d, e}. Hence, c
satisfies the trivial necessary condition for being made a winner by
adding a single vote.
To see that there is no successful manipulation we notice that
SP (c, d) = SP (d, c) − 2. Hence the manipulation must increase
the weight of at least one critical c-d-path. As there is only one
critical c-d-path this forces e  a  d in the manipulator’s vote.
But on the other hand SP (c, b) = SP (b, c) − 2 requires that the
weight of every critical b-c-path decreases which implies that a  e
or d  a, which gives a contradiction.
Consider the preference relations that are output by the rules.
Following the first rule we add e  a  d and c  b. Following
the second rule, we add d  {a, b, e}. This creates a cycle and
thus cannot be completed to a linear order.
Next, we show that the rules do not find the manipulator vote
even if such a manipulation exists for the co-winner UCM problem
using Examples 8–9.
EXAMPLE 8. Consider an election with four alternatives
{a, b, c, d}. Figure 8(b) shows its WMG and the corresponding
table of maximum strengths. The set of winners is {a, b, d} and
SP (x, c) − SP (c, x) 6 2, x ∈ WP . Following the first rule we
add c  d  a  b. However, by the second rule, we add b  a
which creates a cycle. Note that a successful manipulation v exists
v = (c  d  a  b) (Figure 8(c)).
EXAMPLE 9. Consider the election with 11 alternatives from
Example 5. Following the first rule we add c  e1  d1  b1 to
the manipulator vote as pi = (c, e1, d1, b1) is a strongest path from
c to b1. As we showed in Example 5, there does not exist an exten-
sion of this partial order to a total order that makes c a co-winner.
However, a successful manipulation v exists (Figure 7(b)).
Therefore, our study highlights a difference between unique win-
ner and co-winner UCM under Schulze’s rule with a single manip-
ulator and demonstrates that co-winner UCM with a single manip-
ulator was not resolved. Moreover, we believe that Schulze’s rule is
an interesting example, where the tie-breaking in favor of a manip-
ulator, which corresponds to co-winner UCM, makes the problem
non-trivial compared to tie-breaking against manipulators, which
corresponds to unique winner UCM. Two rules with similar prop-
erties have been considered in the literature. Conitzer, Sandholm
and Lang [5] showed that Copeland’s rule is polynomial with 3
candidates in unique winner WCM, while it is NP-hard with 3 can-
didates in co-winner WCM [9]. The most recent result is due to
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra and Rothe [8] who showed that the
online manipulation WCM is polynomial for plurality in the co-
winner model, while it is coNP-hard in the unique winner model.
Our algorithm from Section 5 can still be used as a subroutine to
solve the unique winner UCM problem.
COROLLARY 2. The unique winner UCM problem can be
solved in polynomial time.
PROOF. Run the algorithm from Section 5 with |M | − 1 ma-
nipulators and return the answer. To show the correctness of this
procedure, we need to show that c is a co-winner with |M | − 1
manipulators iff c is a unique winner with |M | manipulators.
(⇒): Suppose c can be made a co-winner with |M |−1 manipu-
lators. Use the Resolvability property to add one more vote to make
c a unique winner.
(⇐): Suppose c can be made a unique winner with |M | manip-
ulators. Therefore, SP (c, x) ≥ SP (x, c) + 2 for every candidate
x ∈ C \{c} in the profile P = PNM ∪PM . Now, remove an arbi-
trary vote of a manipulator and obtain the profile P ′. We have that
SP ′(c, x) ≥ SP (c, x)−1 and SP ′(x, c) ≤ SP (x, c) + 1 for every
candidate x ∈ C \ {c}. Therefore, SP ′(c, x) ≥ SP (c, x) − 1 ≥
SP (x, c)+1 ≥ SP ′(x, c) for every candidate x ∈ C\{c}, showing
that c is a co-winner with |M | − 1 manipulators.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the computational complexity of the coali-
tional weighted and unweighted manipulation problems under
Schulze’s rule. We proved that it is polynomial to manipulate
Schulze’s rule with any number of manipulators in the weighted
co-winner model and in the unweighted case in both unique and
co-winner models. This resolves an open question regarding the
computational complexity of unweighted coalition manipulation
for Schulze’ rule [14]. This vulnerability to manipulation may be
of concern to the many supporters of Schulze’s rule.
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